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SUMMARY
Canada is already at a disadvantage with lagging growth and productivity 
even before the massive economic destruction caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic. Before the pandemic hit, Canada’s corporate tax system was 
already becoming uncompetitive in attracting highly profitable investments 
relative to other developed countries. Canada’s general corporate tax rate, 
averaging 26.1 per cent, is within spitting distance of the highest rates in 
the OECD. While some industries may benefit from special preferences, the 
corporate tax has become increasingly inefficient and complex with targeted 
measures, and in some cases impeding the allocation of capital to growth 
industries like communications and services. 
This was having a serious effect on Canada’s economic health before 
COVID-19. Business investment in Canada has lagged that of many countries 
since 2015, well before the pandemic. Productivity has been weak and wages 
for workers have been depressed, particularly for unskilled labour. 
Additionally, the corporate tax system currently distorts the allocation of 
capital in the economy, favouring some sectors over others. In fact, some of 
the sectors least-favoured by the tax system — including retail and tourism, 
which face an eight-point tax disadvantage compared to the government-
favoured manufacturing sector — are the very ones that had the roughest time 
during the pandemic and face a more difficult road to recovery.
† We wish to thank the editor, Ken McKenzie, and two anonymous reviewers for detailed comments that significantly improved 
the paper.
1
If Canada is going to “build back better,” as some politicians claim to want, it will need 
investors willing to build things. That will require governments focusing on policies that 
stimulate economic growth, including tax reform. 
While it is politically popular for some parties to push for higher corporate tax rates, 
that won’t solve our investment problem. Some limited benefit can be realized by 
reducing tax rates and broadening the corporate base elsewhere but Canada’s 
unwieldy corporate income tax has become too serious for those measures to 
sufficiently address the problem. A broader approach to corporate tax reform will be 
required to ensure that Canada is able to recover to good economic health after the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
2
The 2020 pandemic has altered the economy’s course with the worst recession since 
the Great Depression. Well into the year 2021, COVID-19 health restrictions still linger 
and will continue to do so until herd immunity is established. This tax competitiveness 
report is therefore focused less on the year 2020, and more on the prospects for a 
post-COVID recovery. Will the priority be on growth, investment and getting people 
back to work? Or will governments be concerned about their damaged balance sheets 
and raise corporate levies? 
Fiscal pressures could result in higher taxes. We will argue, however, that a focus on 
growth and productivity should be the priority for corporate tax policy if a country’s 
investment performance has been weak prior to the pandemic. That is the case of 
Canada. 
Most corporate tax changes in 2020 were responses to the pandemic.1 Of 94 countries, 
72 deferred payment of corporate taxes in 2020, 25 introduced new deductions or tax 
credits and 21 extended carry-forward or carry-back provisions for losses. Ten countries 
introduced accelerated depreciation. Canada was not one of these countries; by and 
large, no corporate tax changes occurred in Canada, except for Alberta accelerating by 
a year and half its corporate rate reduction from 10 to eight per cent, as of July 1, 2020.
Instead, Canada’s policy focused on temporary relief, including tax deferrals, wage 
and rent subsidies, and liquidity programs. Perhaps this reflects that Canada already 
had a relatively low marginal effective tax rate (METR) on capital in 2020 (15.6 per 
cent with temporary accelerated depreciation and 19.5 per cent without), well below 
the averages for the G7, OECD and 94-country group surveyed in this study. While its 
METR is relatively low, Canada’s corporate income tax rate — averaging 26.1 per cent 
— is above the current U.S. rate (25.7 per cent) and the OECD GDP-weighted average 
(25.8 per cent), the 10th highest of 34 OECD countries. It is not far off the highest 
corporate income tax rates among OECD countries (Portugal is at 31.5 per cent and 
Japan at 30.6 per cent).
While Canada’s corporate tax system is competitive for marginal investments, due to 
temporary accelerated-depreciation allowances, it is less attractive for highly profitable 
projects that are “lumpy” (i.e., consisting of large lumps of capital investment), because 
of Canada’s relatively high corporate income tax rate by international standards. More 
concerning is that the corporate tax system is distorting the allocation of capital in 
the economy.2 Federal and provincial governments have recently been swinging back 
towards introducing new tax preferences, such as accelerated depreciation, in part to 
reduce fiscal costs. However, these initiatives create a more distortionary corporate tax 
system with respect to capital allocation, as seen in the wide variation in METRs across 
industries and assets. 
1 
Analysis is based on legislation adopted by end of 2020. Any 2021 budgetary changes are not included in 
estimates.
2 
Taxation is one source of distortion in capital markets. Others include regulations and imperfect competition, 
both potentially resulting in higher markups and regulations. In a recent paper, Baquee and Farhi (2020) find 
that the misallocation of capital reduces productivity by 15 per cent. Similarly, Da-Rocha, Mendes Tavaremal 
and Retuccia (2020) find that misallocation due to differential taxes on establishments cause substantial 
productivity losses — one half due to the static effect and other half to a dynamic effect. 
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A high-rate and non-neutral corporate tax system, we shall argue, undermines 
productivity. With lumpy investment, a high statutory tax rate that falls on economic 
rents, discourages the location of highly profitable resource- and knowledge-based 
projects in a country.3 High corporate income tax rates also discourage companies 
from keeping profits in Canada as companies book more administrative and financing 
expenses here rather than in low-tax countries, despite recent policies to curtail 
profit-shifting. 
This paper is focused on the taxation of investment; its focus is on the corporate 
income tax. As is well known, investment also depends on other factors, such as 
domestic and international demand for goods and services, infrastructure, regulations 
and policy uncertainty. The current weak investment climate in Canada is substantially 
influenced by other factors that we later mention. Nonetheless, we should avoid 
substantial increases in taxes on investment. This is a particular concern, as recent G7 
discussions could encourage higher corporate taxes in the future, making it harder for 
economies to recover from the 2020 recession.
Critically, the investment climate in Canada needs to be improved. New capital 
spending is crucial, since companies replace older vintages of capital with more 
advanced technologies. Investment also increases available value-added to raise 
employment and worker salaries. Numerous studies, including McKenzie and Ferede 
(2018), find that reductions in corporate taxes contribute to higher wages as a product 
of more investment. 
In the discussion below, we begin with a review of 2020 corporate tax changes 
among the 94 countries surveyed in this paper. This will be followed by our annual 
comparisons of corporate income tax rates and METRs across groups and individual 
countries. We then review METRs in Canada for industries and provinces, before 
turning to Canada’s investment performance as background for directions for 
corporate tax reform.
CORPORATE TAX CHANGES: WHAT HAPPENED IN 2020?
With the pandemic-induced downturns in many sectors, governments implemented 
various programs to help support the economy. Tax payments were deferred. Central 
banks provided credit support to minimize bankruptcies. Governments provided 
temporary financial support for households and businesses, including wage subsidies. 
As part of a much broader package, corporate tax measures were typically in the form 
of tax deferral and temporary relief.
As shown in Table 1, 72 of 94 countries provided corporate tax deferrals (with 32 
providing waivers for penalties and interest). With respect to corporate tax changes, 
3 
Devereux and Griffith (2002) provide a measure of “average” effective tax rates to capture the notion that 
corporate location could be discouraged by high taxes on above-normal (economic) profits. However, ex post 
measurement of above-normal rates of return to capital may be evidence of compensation for risk instead of 
the presence of economic rent. Since we cannot disentangle risk from economic profits in measuring above-
normal rates of return to capital, it is useful to at least provide comparisons of both statutory corporate 
income tax rates and marginal effective tax rates.
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the two most popular were higher deductions or tax credits (typically temporary) 
and a more liberal treatment of tax losses, such as extending carry-back and carry-
forward periods. Extending carry-back loss provisions was one of the more interesting 
shifts this year. This provided immediate cash to companies so long as they had paid 
corporate income taxes in earlier years. Canada did not make any adjustments to its 
loss-offsetting provisions.
Table 1: Number of Countries with Corporate Tax Adjustments During the  
COVID Recession
G7 OECD Global (95 countries)
Rate adjustment 1 2 5
Deferral* 6 27 72
Interest/penalty waiver 1 10 32
Wage subsidy* 3 8 15
Capital subsidies* 3 9 9
Loan assistance/guarantee 2 6 7
Tax-loss extension 4 16 21
Higher deductions/credits 5 16 29
*Canada provided corporate tax deferrals and wage and rental subsidies as COVID relief measures. 
Source: EY Tax COVID-19 Response Tracker (2020).
A few countries revised corporate income tax rates in 2020. The United Kingdom 
suspended its legislated tax-rate reduction from 19 to 17 per cent in 2020, while 
bumping up the capital-cost allowance for structures from two to three per cent. In 
the U.K.’s March 2021 budget,4 it introduced a two-year, 130-per-cent super-deduction 
for depreciable assets. This will be followed by an increase in the corporate income tax 
rate from 19 to 25 per cent for profits in excess of 250,000 pounds beginning April 1, 
2023. Besides reversing its low corporate-tax-rate policy, the shift represents another 
major change. Since 2008, the U.K. has lowered its top corporate income tax rate by 10 
points to 20 per cent, eliminating the difference in rates between small and large firms. 
In 2023, corporate income tax rates will vary again by profit size.
Chile reduced its corporate income tax rate from 22 to 10 per cent for small and 
medium-sized businesses until 2023, while Colombia targeted a corporate income tax-
rate reduction for air transport. Kenya lowered its general corporate income tax from 
30 to 25 per cent, and Romania provided a discount to corporate tax payments on a 
short-run basis. Outside of Alberta’s acceleration by a year and half of its corporate-
rate reduction from 10 to eight per cent, no other rate or base changes of importance 
were adopted in 2020. 
Several countries have legislated changes in corporate income tax rates beyond 2020. 
Of the 94 countries, these include Austria (from 25 per cent in 2020 to 21 per cent by 
4 
As we include legislated changes adopted by the end of 2020 in our analysis, any 2021 tax changes, such as 
the new U.K. budget, are not included.
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2023), France (continuing its rate reduction to 25 per cent by 2022), Colombia (32 to 
30 per cent by 2022) and Indonesia (22 to 20 per cent by 2022).
Not surprisingly, very few countries have made long-run adjustments to their 
corporate tax policies in 2020. Tax measures have been largely temporary to deal 
with the economic impact from health restrictions and lockdowns. With respect to the 
corporate income tax, a key post-COVID issue is whether to raise corporate tax to deal 
with fiscal pressures or reduce corporate taxes to encourage economic growth and 
economic adjustment. Governments used corporate tax policy to encourage growth 
in the year after the 2008 financial crisis. Unlike other taxes, corporate income tax 
rates and effective tax rates on capital continued to fall after 2009, despite the sharp 
increase in public debt among many countries. We will return to these issues below. 
Probably, the most important shift in corporate tax policy recently are measures 
to reduce the scope for shifting corporate profits to low-tax jurisdictions. The G20 
countries have agreed to a 15-per-cent minimum corporate income tax on foreign 
profits earned by companies with more than $750 million in revenues (similar to 
proposals made in OECD Pillar Two discussions).5 While it is too early to tell how this 
proposal will be implemented, it could increase taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries of 
a parent residing in a capital-exporting country when covered taxes — foreign-profit 
and withholding taxes — are less than 15 per cent of profits. This current proposal will 
require agreement on the base (potentially book profits). 
CANADA HAS LOST ITS CORPORATE INCOME TAX-RATE 
ADVANTAGE
Although 2020 has been a relatively quiet year for corporate tax reforms, we note that 
Canada virtually lost its corporate income tax-rate advantage after 2016. As shown 
in Figure 1 below, Canada’s federal-provincial corporate income tax rate (including 
Alberta’s eight-per-cent rate) was 26.1 per cent in 2020, about equal to the GDP-
weighted average of corporate income tax rates in the OECD (25.8 per cent)6. In 2016, 
Canada had a tax advantage of almost five points, compared to the OECD weighted-
average tax rate. 
5 
For Pillar Two discussions, see https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-global- 
anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf. The OECD has also discussed a special tax on large technology 
companies to shift from a pure-source base tax, according to where profits are earned, to one in which part 
of the income would be allocated to where users reside.
6 
This rate includes the legislated rate reductions mentioned earlier and excludes the U.K.s rate hike legislated  
in 2021.
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Figure 1: Canada and Weighted-Average General Corporate Income Tax Rates Among 
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Note: General corporate income tax rates are the combined central-subnational corporate rate plus any 
profit-based contribution rates applicable to large companies. Legislated corporate tax rate changes are 
applied the year they are passed. 
While Canada’s general corporate income tax rate has changed little since 2013, other 
countries have reduced corporate income tax rates (Figure 2). This includes the U.S. 
(from 39.1 to 25.7 per cent after 2017) and France (from over 35 per cent to 25.8 per 
cent by 2022). The new Biden administration has proposed raising the U.S. rate to 28 
per cent, although Congress will make the final determination. As mentioned above, the 
U.K. is reversing course by hiking its general corporate income tax rate in 2023 from 19 
to 25 per cent, almost back to where it was in 2011 when the rate was 26 per cent. 
On a regional GDP-weighted average basis,7 we note that Canada’s corporate income 
tax rate is slightly below the Americas’ average (26.8 per cent), slightly above the 
average for Asia and Oceania (25.6 per cent), and well above the European and 
94-country averages (23.6 and 25.4 per cent, respectively). A comparison of individual 
corporate income tax rates is provided in Figure 2 below.
Overall, 64 of 94 countries now levy corporate income tax rates at 26 per cent or 
below, with the lowest rates found in Europe (Hungary at nine per cent, Bulgaria at 10 
per cent and Ireland at 12.5 per cent). 
7 
Details in the appendix.
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w = GDP-weighted average.         
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Besides the U.S. and France, sharp reductions of over five points in corporate income 
tax rates since 2016 have occurred in Belgium (eight points), Greece (five points), India 
(12 points), Argentina (10 points), Colombia (10 points), Hungary (10 points), and Kenya 
(five points). Only a few countries have increased corporate income tax rates since 2016 
(Egypt, Latvia, Pakistan, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, South Korea, the Slovak 
Republic, Tunisia and Slovenia). Generally, corporate income tax rates have continued 
to fall globally, dropping over four points from a GDP-weighted average of 29.6 per 
cent in 2016 to 25.4 per cent among the 94 countries. Canada has stood still, except for 
the tax-rate reduction in Alberta.
MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: IMPACT ON INVESTMENT
To gauge how corporate taxation in open economies impacts investment, we measure 
the METR, similar to our earlier reports. The tax paid on profits from investment 
depends on more than just the corporate income tax rate. It depends on provisions 
that determine taxable profits such as interest, depreciation, inventory cost, fees and 
other deductions including non-profit taxes. Investment allowances and tax credits 
also reduce the profit-tax base. On the other hand, inflation can affect the value of 
investment deductions. Depreciation and inventory deductions based on historical 
values are eroded by inflation, while nominal-interest deductions can be beneficial 
to holding assets with inflating values.8 Overall, if tax deductions are more than the 
8 
Inventory deductions based on FIFO (first in, first out) valuation results in the use of the historical prices to 
measure the cost of replacing inventories. This results in a higher effective tax rate. LIFO (last in, first out) 
enables companies to deduct inventory costs closer to replacement cost. Many countries provide an average 
pricing approach.
9
economic (including inflation-indexed) costs of employing capital, then the effective 
tax rate on capital will be below the statutory corporate income tax rate, thereby 
encouraging capital investment. Alternatively, tax deductions that are smaller than 
economic costs can lead to an effective tax rate above the statutory corporate tax rate.
Other tax provisions also affect investment costs. These include sales taxes on capital 
purchases, wealth or asset-based corporate taxes and transfer taxes on real property 
and financial transactions. These additional taxes increase the effective tax rate on 
capital. In our analysis, we do not include labour taxes, such as employer-based payroll 
taxes, since these affect the cost of labour, not capital. As discussed in our 2019 report 
(Bazel and Mintz 2020), a tax on the cost of producing goods would be a weighted 
average of effective capital and labour tax rates, which we have calculated for 
provinces in Canada but are unable to apply to the 94 countries. 
In the appendix, we provide some details on the parameters that drive the country 
models, including inflation rates, tax-depreciation rates, inventory-cost valuation, and 
other taxes. With most countries having value-added taxes (VATs) as sales taxes, few 
countries levy non-refundable sales tax on capital inputs purchased by manufacturing 
and service industries (except the VAT-exempt financial sector). We note that 13 
countries levy asset-based taxes (the highest in Kazakhstan, at 1.5 per cent); that 
number would be much larger if we included effective municipal property tax rates 
that are not measurable across countries. The most frequently used taxes are capital 
transfer taxes (typically real estate transfer tax), which are applied in 56 countries. 
We assume that these taxes are applied at the time assets are initially purchased 
and avoided through tax-planning arrangements if assets are resold. To evaluate the 
effect of taxes, we estimate the METR, which is explained in Box A. The theoretical 
methodology used in the analysis has been provided in numerous past publications and 
is not repeated here.9 
9 
See Mintz and Bazel (2015). We include all industries except oil and gas, mining and finance. For a more  
limited comparison of oil and gas by country, see Mintz (2016), and for mining, see Bazel and Mintz (2019).
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BOX A
The impact of taxes on capital investment is based on an analytical measure of the 
marginal effective tax rate (METR). The METR is the annualized value of corporate 
taxes paid as a percentage of the pre-tax profitability of marginal investments. 
Marginal investments are those that are incremental to the economy: They earn 
sufficient profit to attract financing from investors, covering risk and taxes. At the 
margin, businesses invest in capital until the rate of return on capital, net of taxes 
and risk, is equal to the cost of financing capital (or the interest rate). If the rate of 
return is more (less) than financing costs, firms will invest more (less) in capital. Thus, 
if a government increases the tax rate, it will result in businesses rejecting marginal 
projects that were profitable before taxes were increased. 
For example, suppose companies must pay out in after-tax profits a return (net of risk 
and taxes) equal to five per cent to attract financing from equity and bondholders for 
a new investment project. If the tax wedge is 50 per cent, it means that the company 
must earn a 10-per-cent net-of-risk rate of return to cover taxes and cost of financing. 
If the project earns less than 10 per cent as a pre-tax rate of return, the project will 
not move forward. Of course, some projects might earn more than a 10-per-cent rate 
of return on capital, but as long as the minimal rate of return is earned, a project will 
be profitable to undertake. Therefore, if the tax wedge decreases, more investment 
projects become profitable, since a lower rate of return is acceptable to cover both 
tax and financing costs. 
Briefly, the effective tax rate, or tax wedge, is the portion of capital-related taxes 
paid as a share of the pre-tax rate of return on capital for marginal investments (on 
the assumption that businesses invest in capital until the after-tax return on capital 
is equal to the cost of financing capital). Taxes that impinge on capital investment 
include corporate income taxes (the rate and base), sales taxes on capital purchases 
(such as retail sales taxes), asset-based taxes (capital taxes and property taxes), 
and transfer taxes on real estate and financial transactions. In our analysis, we have 
included most taxes except municipal property taxes, since they are difficult to 
measure due to variations in municipal rates and bases, and are unobservable by 
industry (even for Canada). 
In our analysis, we use similar capital structures to isolate tax differences among 
94 countries (country-specific capital weights, if available, would give a different 
ranking). The capital structures, reflecting the distribution of assets among machinery, 
buildings, inventory and land investments, are based on Canadian data. Economic 
depreciation rates for assets are also based on Statistics Canada estimates. Bond 
interest rates reflect differences in inflation rates across countries (following the 
purchasing-power-parity assumption). Equity costs are based on a marginal supplier 
of finance equating the after-tax rates of return on stocks and bonds (the marginal 
investor is assumed to be a G7 investor holding an international portfolio of bonds and 
equity). The analysis includes manufacturing and service industries (services include 
construction, utilities, transportation, communications, trade, and other business and 
household services).
11
When it comes to investments with returns just sufficient to attract international 
capital, Canada’s METR is competitive internationally. As shown in Figure 3, Canada’s 
METR at 15.6 per cent is well below the OECD weighted average of 23.4 per cent. It 
is also well below the G7 average (25.3 per cent). It is also below the average of BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), at 24.6 per cent, and the average of the 94 
countries, at 23.2 per cent. Going back to 2016, Canada’s METR was much higher, by 
almost five points (20.7 per cent), but so was the METR of other countries, which were 
especially influenced by the U.S. rate, prior to the tax reform implemented there on 
Jan. 1, 2021. 





























w = GDP-weighted average.
A significant step in reducing the METR from 20.7 per cent in 2016 to 15.6 per cent in 
2020 in Canada was the adoption of temporary accelerated depreciation in November 
2018, a move largely seen as a direct response to the U.S. tax reform containing a 
similar temporary incentive.10 Introduced by Canada’s minister of finance as part of 
the Accelerated Investment Incentive, new purchases of manufacturing and clean-
energy machinery are expensed for five years, with a phase-out from 2024–27. Regular 
depreciation rates were boosted by one-and-a-half times the statutory capital-cost-
allowance rate, also for five years, which were to be similarly phased out thereafter. The 
half-year convention — restricting first-year tax depreciation to one-half of the statutory 
capital-cost-allowance rate — was also dropped on a corresponding temporary basis. 
The provinces that collect their own corporate income tax (Quebec and Alberta) also 
adopted accelerated depreciation on a temporary basis. 
10 
As one element of U.S. reform, investments in assets with lives less than 20 years qualify for 100-per-cent 
bonus depreciation for five years (to be phased out thereafter). 
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When temporary accelerated depreciation is fully phased out in 2028, Canada’s METR 
will rise from 15.6 per cent to 19.5 per cent.11 The U.K. METR will rise from 21.2 to 26.5 
per cent. The U.S. will also be phasing out bonus depreciation by 2028 and might be 
increasing its corporate tax rate (the Biden campaign proposed a corporate income tax 
rate of 28 per cent). If both of those measures are brought in, the U.S. METR will rise by 
almost a half, from 22.6 to 32.1 per cent. These increases will slow down investment — 
in the U.K., by potentially 20 per cent.12
On a regional basis (see the appendix), Canada’s METR in 2020 is well below the 
average of its most direct competitors in the Americas (24.0 per cent), as well as Asia 
and Oceania (26.2 per cent) and Europe (21.1 per cent). Canada’s METR is above that of 
Africa (12.7 per cent) and the Middle East and North African countries (7.9 per cent). As 
for all 94 countries, GDP-weighted average is 23.2 per cent, almost eight points higher 
than Canada’s. Canada’s existing METR is 40th lowest of 94 countries (Figure 4). 
Much of Canada’s competitiveness for marginal projects is driven by exceedingly low 
manufacturing METRs. As shown in the appendix, the manufacturing METR in Canada 
is only 9.4 per cent, one of the lowest in the OECD (the lowest are Estonia at 8.8 
per cent, Slovenia and Switzerland both at 8.5 per cent, and Turkey at 5.3 per cent). 
Services are taxed more heavily in Canada at an METR of 17.6 per cent, about eight 
points higher than manufacturing. The Canadian METR on services is only somewhat 
below other countries.
Few other industrialized countries tax services so heavily relative to manufacturing as 
Canada does. Among the 94 countries, Brazil favours manufacturing more heavily than 
services (17.5 per cent and 40.1 per cent respectively) primarily due to a non-refundable 
VAT on capital purchases made by the service sector. Other countries that favour 
manufacturing over services include Guyana (24.3 and 34.8 per cent respectively), Kenya 
(3.3 and 17.1 per cent respectively) and Lesotho (11.9 and 23.9 per cent respectively). 
Some other countries have done the opposite — favouring services much more than 
manufacturing, such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Ukraine and Zambia.
Leaving aside the obvious distortions favouring some business activities over others, it 
also raises issue regarding post-COVID recovery. The most heavily affected industries 
by the pandemic are services such as air transportation, retail and tourism, where 
economic adjustments will be critical. Yet, Canada and several other countries have 
a strong bias towards manufacturing, which has almost returned to its pre-pandemic 
production levels.
11 
Some other tax changes occurred in Canada during the 2016–20 period, including the corporate-tax-rate 
reduction in Alberta. Thus, without accelerated depreciation, the 2020 METR is less than the 2016 METR.
12 
See M. Devereux (2021). https://oxfordtax.sbs.ox.ac.uk/article/what-will-the-budget-do-for-corporate-
investment.
13










































































































































































































































































































































































































w = GDP-weighted average.
A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL METRS
Given Canada’s federal nature, a detailed look at federal-provincial METRs is in order. 
As shown in tables 2a and 2b, METRs are calculated by industry and province and 
by asset type and province for 2020. Also provided are the METR by industry and 
province in 2020 under the assumption that accelerated depreciation is fully phased 
out (Table 2c). What is striking is the degree of tax non-neutrality among provinces, 
assets, and industries, largely but not exclusively driven by federal policy through the 
Accelerated Investment Incentive and the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit. 
As mentioned above, Canada has a corporate tax policy that strongly favours 
manufacturing, a trend going back to 1972 when U.S. competitiveness was a significant 
concern (Jog and Mintz 1989). Forestry and forest-related manufactured products 
is also heavily favoured, with an METR that is 7.2 per cent, driven by accelerated tax 
depreciation and the federal Atlantic credits and other various provincial tax credits 
(Figure 5a). Agriculture, transportation/storage, communication and utility sectors are 
taxed at rates close to the average METR in Canada, while the rest of the service sector 
(construction, trade and other household and business services) bear above-average 
METRs, in excess of 20 per cent. This bias against the service sector was a significant 
concern in the report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1997), which 
recommended reducing corporate income tax rates to the tax rate on manufacturing 
income to improve neutrality. The federal government proceeded in that direction after 
2000, but reversed course in 2007, amplifying differences further in 2018. 
15


























































Canada 14.7% 7.2% 15.4% 20.8% 7.4% 21.1% 22.9% 14.8% 15.9% 20.4% 15.6%
Newfoundland 10.1% -16.1% 14.6% 22.6% -13.3% 23.2% 24.0% 13.3% 14.1% 19.0% 8.0%
Prince Edward Island -0.4% -37.5% 15.5% 23.5% -52.5% 24.4% 25.3% 19.8% 14.1% 22.7% 11.3%
Nova Scotia 7.9% -16.5% 14.4% 21.9% -20.5% 22.7% 23.9% 13.9% 14.0% 19.4% 12.3%
New Brunswick 2.2% -16.2% 14.2% 21.8% -12.3% 22.6% 23.6% 15.7% 13.8% 19.0% 10.7%
Quebec 15.0% -1.2% 12.2% 19.5% -0.7% 20.3% 21.4% 12.4% 11.1% 18.2% 11.5%
Ontario 15.2% 10.3% 13.0% 19.9% 11.5% 20.5% 22.1% 14.0% 12.8% 18.3% 15.1%
Manitoba 18.7% 1.9% 23.6% 26.7% -3.9% 25.3% 26.3% 20.5% 25.0% 28.6% 21.0%
Saskatchewan 17.9% 10.9% 22.7% 25.7% 12.5% 26.0% 26.1% 18.5% 26.9% 27.6% 20.6%
Alberta 11.0% 9.2% 10.3% 16.7% 12.0% 17.2% 17.8% 9.7% 9.8% 13.8% 12.1%
British Columbia 21.3% 18.3% 25.8% 28.0% 18.2% 26.7% 28.8% 21.7% 30.3% 31.5% 25.6%


























































Canada* 20.8% 8.4% 12.4% 24.2% 15.6%
Newfoundland 12.2% -12.0% 13.3% 27.9% 8.0%
Prince Edward Island 19.8% -14.4% 14.3% 28.6% 11.3%
Nova Scotia 18.9% -3.1% 13.7% 26.8% 12.3%
New Brunswick 17.0% -6.2% 13.3% 27.0% 10.7%
Quebec 19.7% -5.0% 12.4% 24.6% 11.5%
Ontario 20.9% 5.7% 12.7% 24.1% 15.1%
Manitoba 20.2% 22.9% 13.1% 25.0% 21.0%
Saskatchewan 21.7% 21.5% 11.4% 24.2% 20.6%
Alberta 16.3% 6.3% 9.4% 21.3% 12.1%
British Columbia 27.9% 27.9% 14.0% 25.1% 25.6%













































Canada 18.3% 13.3% 19.0% 23.0% 13.7% 23.2% 24.7% 17.8% 22.1% 24.5% 19.5%
Newfoundland 12.8% -5.3% 18.9% 25.1% -3.9% 25.6% 26.0% 17.6% 21.5% 24.0% 13.3%
Prince Edward Island 4.7% -22.4% 19.8% 26.1% -33.9% 26.7% 27.3% 22.7% 22.0% 27.0% 16.3%
Nova Scotia 10.8% -5.7% 18.5% 24.3% -8.0% 25.0% 25.8% 17.6% 21.1% 24.3% 17.1%
New Brunswick 6.2% -5.6% 18.3% 24.3% -2.6% 24.8% 25.5% 18.8% 21.0% 23.8% 15.6%
Quebec 18.4% 5.1% 16.2% 21.8% 5.7% 22.5% 23.3% 15.9% 18.2% 22.8% 15.8%
Ontario 18.8% 16.2% 16.8% 22.1% 17.8% 22.6% 23.9% 17.2% 19.4% 22.7% 19.3%
Manitoba 22.5% 9.1% 26.8% 28.7% 4.8% 27.3% 28.0% 23.2% 30.3% 32.1% 24.5%
Saskatchewan 22.2% 16.5% 25.9% 27.8% 17.9% 27.9% 27.8% 21.0% 31.9% 31.0% 24.0%
Alberta 14.6% 14.5% 13.7% 18.8% 16.8% 19.2% 19.5% 12.5% 15.9% 18.2% 15.5%
British Columbia 24.4% 23.4% 28.9% 30.0% 23.4% 28.6% 30.4% 24.4% 34.8% 34.7% 28.7%
This favouritism can also be seen in the METR bias towards machinery-intensive 
businesses (Figure 5b). While investments in machinery bear an METR of 8.4 per cent 
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and investments in land bear 12.4 per cent, investments in structures are taxed at 20.8 
per cent and inventories at 24.2 per cent (the latter due to FIFO accounting). 
As for the provinces, the METR on investment in British Columbia is the highest 
in Canada (and close to the OECD average) at 25.6 per cent. This is followed by 
Manitoba at 21 per cent and Saskatchewan at 20.6 per cent. All three of these 
provinces rely on the retail sales tax that results in high METRs on machinery and 
equipment and structures (Figure 5b). If the provinces harmonized their sales taxes 
with the federal GST, most sales taxes on capital purchases would be refunded, 
thereby reducing the METR. 
The lowest METRs are in the Atlantic provinces, largely driven by the federal Atlantic 
Investment Tax Credit that is available to agriculture, forestry and manufacturing 
industries. Quebec also has a low METR at 11.5 per cent, driven by federal as well as 
provincial incentives for investments in machinery and equipment. 
Alberta’s METR is now 12.1 per cent, in part reflecting its corporate income tax rate of 
eight per cent. With the federal rate, Alberta companies bear a corporate income tax 
rate of 23 per cent, which is one of the lowest in North America (the U.S. federal rate is 
21 per cent, and some states — Nevada, Ohio, Texas and Washington — currently do not 
have a corporate income tax13). If the U.S. increases its federal corporate income tax 
rate, Alberta will have the lowest corporate income tax rate in North America as well as 
one of the lowest METRs on capital.
While Canada has a relatively low METR to encourage capital investment, its corporate 
tax has become more distortionary. The inter-industry and inter-asset dispersion index 
(see Chen and Mintz 2010 for its explanation) has increased by more than two-and-a-
half times from 2016 (.0732 compared to 0.0286). These non-neutralities have several 
economic impacts: 
• They undermine productivity as businesses shift capital to projects in part 
to benefit from tax preferences. While some preferences may be given to 
activities that generate unremunerated benefits to other firms (e.g., research 
and development and exploration expenditures), many preferences are driven 
by political considerations rather than to correct market failures. Distortionary 
taxes, including the corporate income tax, have been found to reduce 
economic growth rates, unlike less distortionary taxes such as consumption 
taxes and property taxes (e.g., Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel 1999 and Baquee 
and Farhi 2020). 
13 
These four states have gross receipt taxes. In related work, we have estimated an aggregate METR for a select 
group of U.S. states with gross receipt taxes rather than income taxes. We estimate an aggregate METR of 
19.2 per cent in Texas, 18.1 in Nevada, 27.8 in Washington, and 16.2 in Ohio. These estimates along with others 
can be found in Alberta Budget 2021, Fiscal Plan, “Corporate Marginal Effective Tax Rate Comparison, 2020,” 
p. 151, at https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/6f47f49d-d79e-4298-9450-08a61a6c57b2/resource/ec1d42ee-
ecca-48a9-b450-6b18352b58d3/download/budget-2021-fiscal-plan-2021-24.pdf. 
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• Tax credits and hefty capital-cost deductions can push companies into non-
taxpaying positions, blunting the effectiveness of incentives. On average, 59 
per cent of corporations were non-taxpaying in the years 2012–16.14
• Targeted incentives for capital increase the demand for capital inputs, 
potentially resulting in higher capital-goods prices. Thus, the incentive accrues 
to suppliers of capital and can benefit suppliers rather than the firm (Goolsbee 
(1998) finds 35 to 70 per cent of the incentive accrues to suppliers). 
• Incentives biased towards machinery reduce the demand for unskilled labour, 
while creating more demand for complementary inputs such as skilled labour. 
It can then contribute to more economic inequality (Slavìk and Yazici 2019).
CANADA’S INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
It is well known that Canada’s investment performance since the commodity-price 
crash in late 2014 has been subpar.15 That has contributed to weak per capita GDP 
performance, which can ultimately impact labour compensation. In this section, we will 
tie these issues together.
Canada’s business investment as a share of GDP — the investment rate — has had 
periods of weak performance, with various peaks and valleys, since 1981 (Figure 5). 
During the commodity boom, investment as share of GDP perked up, reaching as high 
as 18 per cent of GDP in 2006 and 2014, but fell back to 13 per cent of GDP by 2019. 
The current level of investment is better than the 1983–97 period, which generally 
saw investment lower than 13 per cent of GDP. At that time, Canada suffered two 
major recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s and experienced high public deficits 
and debt, accompanied by high interest and inflation rates. It was also a period of low 
productivity growth.16 
As we pointed out last year, investment in residential real estate has grown since 2015, 
but not private non-residential investment (Bazel and Mintz 2020). The same trend 
holds true in 2020, with residential investment growing and non-residential investment 
in machinery and structures falling.17 
14 
Canada Revenue Agency, Taxation Statistics, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/prog-policy/ 
stats/t2-corp-stats/2012-2016/t2-crp-sttstcs-tbl09-e.pdf. Little other data are provided to assess the impact 
of tax losses on investment by industry or size of firms. For early work, see Mintz (1988), which shows that tax 
losses can either increase or reduce METRs. 
15 
See, for example, W. Robson and M. Wu (2021), https://www.cdhowe.org/intelligence-memos/robson-wu-–-
our-capital-investment-crisis. 
16 
See, CEIC Data, Canada’s Labour Productivity Growth, 1977-2020, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/
canada/labour-productivity-growth.
17 
Statistics Canada, “Gross domestic product, income and expenditure, fourth quarter 2020,” https://www150.
statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/210302/dq210302a-eng.htm?HPA=1.
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Source: Statistics Canada Table 36-10-0096-01 and Table 36-10-0222-01.
More disaggregated information provides further understanding with respect to 
Canada’s lagging investment performance. Real private non-residential investment 
declined by seven per cent since 2015 (Figure 6a). Engineering construction (e.g., 
heavy and civil engineering as defined by Statistics Canada) has been the weakest, 
falling 15 per cent, followed by machinery and investment, falling almost seven per cent. 
Non-residential building investment recovered to roughly its 2015 value in 2019, and 
investment in intellectual-property products rose five per cent over the four years. 
Figure 6a: Private Non-Residential Real Investment Growth by Asset Type
Source: Statistics Canada 36-10-0096-01.
19
Superficially, it might be presumed that much of the decline in business investment has 
been linked entirely to the resource sector, particularly the energy industry. However, 
that is not the case. As shown in Figure 6b, the largest decline from 2015 to 2019 was 
in mining, quarrying, and oil and gas (30 per cent) as expected, but several other 
industries experienced a loss in investment as well. These include retail trade (-14 per 
cent), agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (-21 per cent), and the finance, insurance, 
real estate, rental and leasing industries (-8 per cent).18 
Manufacturing grew primarily in the last two years, perhaps reflecting expensing under 
the corporate income tax that was adopted November 2018. Construction investment 
rose roughly 10 per cent, partly influenced by the growth in residential real estate. The 
“information and cultural” industry rose just over 18 per cent from 2015 to 2019. The 
best performance over the four years was “transportation and warehousing,” at 31 per 
cent, partly driven by the growth in digital trade. 
Past studies on sectoral investment, such as Parsons (2008), have shown that an 
increase in the METR causes investment to decline. However, other factors clearly affect 
investment, such as growth in demand, interest rates, political stability and regulation. 

































Source: Statistics Canada 36-10-0096-01.
As we discussed in the previous section, the corporate tax is currently not a significant 
obstacle to business investment. Even without accelerated depreciation, Canada’s 
corporate tax burden, measured by the METR, was below its most important 
competitors, including the United States. Nor has it changed much from 2015 to 
November 2019. However, other countries did not stand still, especially the U.S., where 
tax reform resulted in a sharp reduction in the METR. As discussed above, Canada’s 
18 
If real estate was excluded from finance, insurance and leasing, the decline in investment would have been 
steeper, since real estate includes residential construction. 
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general corporate income tax rate is now slightly above the U.S. rate and the OECD 
average. Large-scale, lumpy investment projects that earn high economic rents, such 
as in knowledge-based and resource industries, are less competitive for companies to 
locate in Canada when the general corporate tax rate is high. 
In Figure 7, we compare gross fixed capital formation, or what might be more 
commonly referred to as investment in physical capital (including both private and 
public investment) by OECD country. Certainly the commodity downturn affected 
resource economies most (e.g., Canada, Australia, Brazil and Mexico), although some 
other resource economies, such as Norway, India, Russia and New Zealand, had 
growing investment expenditures. 
Countries are grouped according to whether a country is (i) high-taxed (corporate rates 
that are 30 per cent or above), (ii) low-taxed (19 per cent or less), (iii) medium-taxed 
(corporate tax rates ranging from 20 to 29 per cent) or (iv) experienced significant 
corporate-tax-rate reductions of at least five points during the period 2016–19. Only 
Estonia and Latvia tax distributed profits at 20 per cent (reinvested profits are exempt), 
so we treat these countries as low-taxed. 
Once public investment is included, gross fixed capital formation in Canada shrank 
by 0.5 per cent during these four years, less than the medium-taxed country average 
(11.1 per cent). This contrasts to low-tax countries, which saw 15.8 per cent growth, 
with the highest growth being in Ireland (115.1 per cent). High-tax countries had 
paltry investment growth (3.7 per cent). Those countries that had sharp reductions in 
corporate rates, all of which had high corporate income tax rates in 2016, had quite 
good investment growth (14.4 per cent). 
Among OECD countries, Canada had the fourth-worst growth in gross fixed capital 
formation since 2015, even worse than other economies with similar corporate income 
tax rates. Among the countries where investment is growing fastest, we see low-tax 
countries, including Ireland, Hungary and Estonia.
21






































































































































































































































































































Note: “Ave. W” represents the GDP-weighted average.
Source: National accounts data via OECD and World Bank.
Obviously, investment depends on multiple factors. The poor Canadian investment 
performance is partly related to economic adjustment arising from the commodity bust 
after 2014. However, the lack of investment in other industries is concerning, given its 
importance to the adoption of new technologies and productivity. Many factors can 
be considered, but the regulatory environment has been criticized the most.19 High 
marginal statutory tax rates at the personal level also imposes a barrier in attracting 
skilled labour and entrepreneurs. The lack of business investment in the U.S. is 
explained by a lack of competition and tightened governance; less so by the switch to 
intangible expenditures or globalization (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017).20 
GDP GROWTH PERFORMANCE
Investment enables an economy to produce more product per worker hours — labour 
productivity. It also has “endogenous” growth effects as companies adopt the latest 
innovations associated with new vintages of capital. This could lead to a substitution 
for labour, but it also enables companies to reduce unit costs and become more 
competitive. As economic studies have shown, investment leads to more demand for 
19 
See, for example, Deloitte’s review of factors impacting investment climate. While Canada’s talent, economic 
stability, access to capital and domestic market support competitiveness compared to other countries, we are 
weak in innovation, high tax rates and regulation. https://www2.deloitte.com/ca/en/pages/finance/articles/
canada-competitiveness-scorecard.html/#accordion1. 
20 
Investments in intangible assets (research and development, software and mineral exploration) contribute to 
labour productivity, but the effect is relatively small (Gu and MacDonald 2020).
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labour as the growth in output more than compensates for any labour displacement.21 
This has been referred to as “capital deepening,” in that workers become more 
productive and businesses more cost efficient due to capital investment.22
Reflecting declining investment, among other factors, Canada’s average five-year 
GDP per-capita growth rate from 2016 to 2020 has turned negative (Figure 8) for 
the first time since the Great Depression. Although annual per capita GDP growth 
was exceptional in the early 1960s at over 4.2 per cent, it fell to an average of 0.5 per 
cent in the 1990s, consistent with Fortin’s (1999) observation. It improved after 2000, 
helped by the commodity boom and, in part, corporate and personal tax reforms, 
but has swung negative to -0.75 per cent for the five-year period 2016–20. Excluding 
2020, the 2016–19 average per-capita growth rate was only 0.45 per cent, similar to the 
underperforming years 1991–2000. In other words, 2020 swamped whatever little per 
capita growth Canada experienced in the previous four years.








































Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth Rate
Source: Statistics Canada, GDP (chained 2012 dollars) and population.
Lower per capita GDP growth can hurt labour compensation as well. In Figure 9 below, 
we show the relationship between hourly labour-compensation and labour-productivity 
measures by value-added (or GDP) per working hour by industrial sector. 
21 
A typical economic model shows that a reduction in the cost of capital increases demand for capital as well  
as labour. The increase in demand for workers is driven by a higher return to labour induced by capital. Of 
course, labour displacement is a major policy concern in that some employees may have difficulty finding 
new employment unless they are retrained. 
22 
The International Labour Organization (2013) concluded in a global review that increases in labour 
productivity within economic sectors are the main driver of economic growth (rather than sectoral 
reallocation). However, more recent work suggests that inter-sectoral differences have a large impact on 
productivity (see footnote 2).
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The non-renewable resource sector generates the highest value-added per working 
hour ($300) and pays the second-highest hourly labour compensation ($62). The 
regulated utility sector generates the second-highest value-added per working hour 
($191) and pays the highest labour compensation ($69 per hour). Manufacturing 
generates value-added per hour equal to $62 and pays workers on average $42 per 
hour. Accommodation and food services — notably one of the hardest hit sectors in the 
pandemic — has the second-least value-added per hour at $23.50, with compensation 
of $20.90 per hour.23 
In general, sectors with higher labour productivity tend to pay higher compensation to 
attract more highly skilled workers. The correlation between value-added per hour and 
hourly employment compensation is 0.61.
Another point to note is that sectors with high value-added not only better compensate 
labour, but also capital owners and governments. Thus, improvements in growth also 
lead to higher household investment income and tax revenues.
Figure 9: Real Value-Added and Employment Compensation per Hour Worked by 
Sector 2019
Notes: Total compensation per hour worked consists of all payments in cash or in kind made by domestic 
producers to workers for services rendered. It includes wages and salaries and employers’ contributions 
for employees, plus an imputed labour income for self-employed workers.
Source: Statistics Canada 36-10-0480-01.
23 
Note that value-added per working hour is quite high for the non-profit sector. This reflects the significant 
amount of voluntary labour in the sector that is included in working hours.
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DIRECTIONS FOR CORPORATE TAX REFORM
So, what have we learned so far?
• Canada’s corporate tax system is attractive to investment in marginal projects, 
although it is more distortionary, resulting in a greater capital misallocation in 
the economy since 2016. Canada also has a relatively high corporate income 
tax rate compared to many countries, thereby making Canada less friendly to 
projects with high economic rents from lumpy intangible capital or resource 
investments. 
• Canada’s pre-pandemic investment performance has been quite disappointing 
since 2015. Overall, business investment lags that of most countries. 
• As a result of weak labour productivity and per-capita GDP growth, companies 
pay lower labour compensation. 
Why corporate tax reform today?
It is important to consider what markets will look like in a post-COVID world once 
health restrictions can be lifted and economies return to growth. The medium-term 
implications are the following:
• Some business sectors, such as technology and transportation services linked 
to home delivery have grown during the recession. Retail and household 
services markets that do not depend on personal contact will continue to be 
disrupted by new technologies in future years. The multinational technology 
sector with large profits and low effective corporate tax rates will be favourite 
candidates for taxation, such as recently proposed digital taxes on sales either 
as a presumptive corporate income tax or an expansion of VATs on digital 
services or both.
• Some sectors were not much affected during the recession, or will have 
few recovery issues, such as utilities, health care, education, transportation 
and logistics, finance and insurance, manufacturing, fishing, forestry, 
construction, mining and public administration. Several sectors, such as health, 
transportation, technology and manufacturing, will be important for domestic 
security. If companies develop flexible working arrangements enabling more 
work-from-home, commercial real estate will be challenged to some extent.
• Some businesses were severely impacted by the pandemic and could take 
several years to recover, if they recover at all. These include accommodation 
and food services, tourism, airlines, retail trade, wholesale trade, commercial 
real estate and certain household and business services that relied on person-
to-person contact. The resource sector is springing back to pre-pandemic 
levels in terms of production and pricing, but faces structural change as the 
world continues its energy transition. 
The pandemic that led to a sharp increase in temporary unemployment initially 
will eventually result in structural unemployment that could last for long periods. 
Eventually, the economy will adjust, but during this recovery period significant new 
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investment is needed. Many have been arguing that Canada should “build back better.” 
If that is the case, our private investment performance needs to be urgently addressed. 
Since 2000, Canada has reformed its corporate tax system to improve neutrality 
and international competitiveness. With respect to international competitiveness, 
the federal-provincial corporate income tax rate, once the highest among OECD 
countries in 1999, has been reduced from 43 to 26 per cent. Capital taxes on non-
financial businesses have been eliminated, except for provincial-municipal property 
taxes, which are levied at higher rates on non-residential compared to residential 
property. Sales taxes on capital purchases have been largely removed, as federal and 
provincial governments have shifted from one-stage retail sales taxes with significant 
taxes on business inputs to value-added taxes (only British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan continue to levy provincial retail sales taxes that result in high METRs, as 
shown above). 
As for neutrality, the difference between large and small corporate income tax rates 
have been reduced at the federal level (although, not so at the provincial level). The 
federal government and most provinces have eliminated differences in corporate 
income tax rates among resource, manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. 
Capital-cost allowances have been adjusted to reflect economic depreciation, except 
for the renewal of manufacturing-machinery expensing in 2006 and the recent 
adoption of accelerated depreciation in 2018. Some investment tax credits still linger at 
the federal and provincial levels. 
In recent years, Canada has shifted away from neutrality, with wide differences in 
tax burdens on business activities, as seen in our METR calculations above. To name 
a few: accelerated depreciation, the small-business deduction, flow-through-share 
tax credits, federal and provincial equity-financing credits, small-business enhanced 
research and development tax credits, the exploration tax credit, the federal Atlantic 
investment tax credit, provincial manufacturing tax credits, wind and solar tax credits, 
interest deductions to earn exempt income, and the pension-plan tax exemption for 
investments in controlled enterprises (Jog and Mintz 2013). 
Even though there is a benefit to the rate reductions combined with base-broadening 
revenue-neutral corporate tax reform that we have pursued since 2000, further effort 
in this direction will likely achieve limited results. The most significant preferences, such 
as the small-business deduction and clean-energy and manufacturing tax preferences, 
are politically driven, so governments will be unwilling to remove them. Even if 
neutrality could be improved by eliminating tax preferences, many businesses and 
employees are unlikely to welcome tax hikes in the wake of the severe 2020 recession.
If foreign countries impose minimum taxes on subsidiaries operating in Canada, it 
could result in tax incentives being less effective in encouraging investment, at least for 
foreign companies operating here. While this may help reduce some distortions, it will 
increase taxes paid by foreign companies in Canada relative to domestic companies, as 
well as deter investment. 
We suggest a broader approach to corporate tax reform be considered in the future. 
That will be a topic left to a forthcoming separate paper. 
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CONCLUSIONS
In the discussion above, several conclusions were reached. First, Canada’s corporate tax 
system is attractive to investment in marginal projects, although it has become much 
more distortionary by favouring certain investment activities, including manufacturing, 
forestry and machinery-intensive businesses, while taxing more heavily services and 
structure-intensive firms. Second, Canada has a relatively high corporate income 
tax rate compared to most countries, thereby being less attractive for projects with 
high economic rents from intangible capital or resource investments. Third, Canada’s 
investment performance has been moribund since 2015, well before the pandemic. 
Overall, business investment has lagged that of most countries. 
As a result of weak labour productivity and per-capita GDP growth, companies pay 
lower labour compensation. 
Canada could further pursue its corporate tax reforms by lowering rates and broadening 
tax bases. However, if the aim is to simply be at or below the OECD average, tax reform 
along these lines would have limited effects in spurring investment. 
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APPENDIX
Marginal Effective Tax Rates (in per cent)
30
* = Simple average.
W = GDP weighted average.
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